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UNFAIR COMPETITION - TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES -'NATURE
OF RELIEF AGAINST THE UsE OF A ·M1sLEADING TRADE NAME WHICH HAS
ACQUIRED A SECONDARY MEANING - The petitioner~ a Pennsylvania manufacturer of cigars which contained only Pennsylvania tobacco, but which it had
branded "Havana Smokers" since 1902, was ordered by the Federal Trade
Commission to cease and desist from using the word "Havana" to designate its
product. The petitioner claimed that the brand had acquired a.secondary meaning and asked the court to modify the order to permit retention of the word
"Havana" qualified by the legend: "Notice. These cigars are made in the
United States and only of United States tobacco." Held, the name so used might
result ih misrepresentation and its use must be abandoned, b.ut that petitioner
could have two years within which to eliminate the word from i~ labels. H. H.
Heusner & Son v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 106 F.

(.2d) 596.

1940}

RECENT DECISIONS

753

It has long been recognized that the continued use of a descriptive term
in connection with a particular product may result in that term's acquiring a
special meaning denominative of the product ( called a secondary meaning)
which is of value to the producer and deserving of protection in the law .1 It is
equally well-recognized that the use of a trade name which is inherently false
and misleading because it purports to be descriptive of the product to which it is
applied, when in fact it is not, may be enjoined as constituting unfair competition.2 Since the long continued use of the term "Havana" in connection with
petitioner's product undoubtedly caused that term to acquire a secondary meaning, the principal case seems to hold that the secondary meaning which may
attach to a trade name when its use under the circumstances may also result in
misrepresentation cannot raise that name to a status of legitimacy in the eyes
of the law,8 though it may influence the method by which the court will order
the name to be eliminated. The court recognized the element of truth in the
contention, as stated by one eminent text writer, that "in the case of particularly
well-known marks and names, the public has become accustomed to associate
a product with a definite taste, appearance, smell, effect, etc., without in the least
being deceived by a product which does not contain exactly what it professes to,
but which is the identical article which had previously satisfied them." 4 But
1

The doctrine of secondary meaning of trade names was first applied in the case
of Wotherspoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 Eng. & Ire. App. 508 (1872), known as the Glenfield Starch case, and the more famous Stone Ale case, Thompson v. Montgomery, 41
Ch. Div. 35 (1889). After some hesitation, the doctrine was applied in the United
States. See: Elgin Natl. Watch Co. v. Loveland, (C. C. Iowa, 1904) 132 F. 41; American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 53 N. E. 141
(1899); Oneida Community v. Oneida Game Trap Co., 168 App. Div. 769, 154
N. Y. S. 391 (1915); Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. Piza, (C. C. N. Y. 1885)
24 F. 149; Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, (C. C. A. 7th, 1898) 86
F. 608. The Act of Feb. 20, 1905, § 5, 33 Stat. L. 726, as amended by Act of Mar.
19, 1920, § 9, 41 Stat. L. 535, 15 U.S. C. (1934), § 85, provided for registration
of nontechnical trade marks and trade names in certain cases after "actual and exclusive
use" during a period of one year, thus recognizing certain rights acquired by secondary
meaning.
2
38 Stat. L. 719 (1914), as amended by 43 Stat. L. 939 (1925), 52 Stat. L.
1028 (1938), 15 U.S. C. (1934), § 45; Federal Trade Comm. v. Algoma Lumber
Co., 291 U.S. 67, 54 S. Ct. 315 (1934) ("California White Pine" for yellow pine);
Masland Duraleather Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) 34 F. (2d)
733 ("Duraleather" without leather). The use of the words "Havana," "Habana,"
"Habana Blend," "Navana," "Cuba," "Cuba Crop," "Mapacuba," "Tampa," "Wheeling," "Wheeling Twins," "Turkey," "Turkish," and "Key West Perfectos," where
used in connection with cigars analytically and geographically unworthy of the name,
have been ordered discontinued by the Federal Trade Commission. Bayuk Cigars, Inc.
v. Federal Trade Comm., 12 F. T. C. 19 (1928), modified( C. C. A. 3d, 1930) 14
F. T. C. 708, 105 CCR TRADE REG. SERV., 1f 505.4465; In re John T. Bolon Cigar
Co., 25 F. T. C. 809 (1937), 106 CCR TRADE REG. SERV., 1f 9100; and numerous
other cases referred to in 105 CCR TRADE REG. SERv., 1f1f 505.4466-505.44756.
3
Cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U. S. 143, 143 S. Ct. 113
(1920); Coty, Inc. v. LeBlume Import Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1923) 292 F. 264.
4
DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 663 (1936).
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the court was not thereby induced to permit the continued use of the name in
question. The decision seems correct in this respect, for though petitioner's
regular customers may no longer be deceived by the name, such is not the case
with new customers or chance purchasers. Nor would the legend: "Notice.
These cigars are made in the United States and only of United States tobacco"
suffice to protect the portion of the public !).Ot already devotees of petit_ioner's
product. As the court pointed out, the implication of the word "Havana" as
applied to petitioner's cigars is totally false, and therefore cannot be truly qualified; it can only be contradicted. Thus the court was bound to decree the elimination of the word "Havana" though it took the secondary meaning factor into
account as a mitigating factor in petitioner's favor/' Another mitigating factor
was called into play by the fact that "the sudden elimination of the word
'Havana' might cause confusion, or even consternation, among the devotees of
petitioner's cigars, as well as substantial loss to petitioner." 6 It should also be
remembered that the petitioner started branding its cigars "Havana Smokers"
in 1902 and therefore acquired much of its patronage during an era when the
maxim "caveat emptor" received more favor, and tacit frau_ds upon the public
were tolerated if not approved. These factors, probably more than the fact that
the name had acquired a secondary meaning, induced the court to modify
the commissioner's order by allowing petitioner two years in which to eliminate
the offending term.7 Considering the flagrancy of the misrepresentation implicit
in the term "Havana" as applied to petitioner's product, the decree seems eminently fair to him. Two years should be ample time for petitioner to make
known- to his patrons that their favorite cigar is about to undergo a change of
name, and if the product has intrinsic merits, petitioner's business should not
be unduly injured by the decree.
Harold M. Street

15 Masland Duraleather Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) 34
F. (2d) 733, presented a similar problem. In that case the commission's order was
modified to allow the petitioner six months use of the word "Duraleather" in representing that the new trade-name stood for petitioner's product.
6 Principal case, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 596 at 597.
7 The decree is supposed to be in keeping with the decree given in the recent case
of Bayuk Cigars, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) 14 F. T. C.
708, 105 CCH TRADE REG. SERV., 1f 505.4465.

